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Book Reviews
Gareau, Brian J. 2013. From Precaution to Proﬁt: Contemporary Challenges to Environmental
Protection in the Montreal Protocol. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Reviewed by David L. Downie
Fairﬁeld University

This interesting and well-researched book provides in-depth analysis of the
ongoing attempt to phase out methyl bromide (MeBr) under the Montreal Protocol. It demonstrates how allowable exemptions, the inﬂuence of large and
predominantly California-based agricultural businesses, and expanding inﬂuence of neo-liberal economic and political paradigms have frustrated efforts
to eliminate this toxic and ozone-depleting substance (ODS). Gareau argues
that the success of economic interests in signiﬁcantly delaying the elimination
of methyl bromide in the United States and in the ozone regime is a worrisome
example of the threat that neoliberalism poses for achieving the ultimate goal of
the ozone regime and for effective global environmental politics in general.
The book helps to ﬁll several important gaps in the secondary literature on
the ozone regime. MeBr is a powerful ODS used as a pesticide, as a fumigant in
shipping containers and to sterilize soil, especially in commercial large-scale
monoculture settings. Its uses are different from, and have received far less
attention than, other ozone-depleting substances. The exemptions for MeBr
are far broader and subject to far less review than for other substances within the
Montreal Protocol process. These include a permissive “critical use exemption”
for agriculture.
Gareau provides the most detailed treatment to date of the political economy of the MeBr issue and how agricultural lobbyists and their political allies,
especially in the United States, have exploited the broader exemptions to keep
using MeBr in relatively large quantities despite the availability of effective
but sometimes more costly substitutes. This analysis not only helps us understand the ongoing evolution of global ozone policy but also provides insights
regarding how to structure exemptions in international environmental treaties.
From Precaution to Proﬁt also provides detailed discussions of other important but understudied aspects of the ozone regime, including the domestic
debates that produced the US’ negotiating positions in the 1990s and 2000s;
attempts by global civil society groups to inﬂuence policy in the US and EU;
and the often-important roles of technical committees within the ozone regime
in framing policy debates. As a sociologist, Gareau brings a different theoretical
lens than most who have examined global environmental politics. Also, the
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book provides a useful counterpoint to the uniformly positive evaluations of
the ozone regime. It is a valuable addition to the literature.
The only potential issue is whether the book would beneﬁt from a better
understanding of the history of the ozone regime and global environmental
politics in general. Gareau argues that the ability of economic interests to exploit
the MeBr exemptions shows that the ozone regime is less effective now than in the
past, and that it has moved from an emphasis on precaution to one on proﬁt. He
views this shift as evidence of increasing acceptance of neoliberal ideology, which
threatens the ability of international actors to effectively manage global problems
and explains why the early ozone regime was more environmentally focused and
effective than it has become or than the climate regime is now.
These observations have elements of truth, but they are sometimes presented in what some might regard as an exaggerated fashion. Economic interests
have always compromised protection of the ozone layer, and there is really no
difference between how and why they do so now than they did in the past.
European states essentially refused to discuss the possibility of coordinating
domestic controls of chloroﬂuorocarbons (CFCs) at the ﬁrst international meetings on the issue in the late 1970s. Europe (supported by Japan and Russia)
prevented the 1985 Vienna Convention from including any control measures,
rejecting arguments for taking precautionary action and stating that the lack of
scientiﬁc certainty did not warrant the cost to their domestic industries.1 The
heralded 50-percent cuts in the “precautionary” 1987 Montreal Protocol actually
required only modest adjustment costs by the EU and Japan industries, as their
governments could meet much of the requirement through controls on CFC-aerosol
sprays and other low hanging fruit.2 The 1990 agreements in London to eliminate
all CFCs, while extraordinary, occurred after most major manufacturers announced
they could substitute other chemicals. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Australia,
China, the US, and others stated they could not support European arguments
that a precautionary approach required accelerating the HCFC phaseout, in part
because the proposed measures would be too expensive given the amount of environmental protection they would produce.
In each case, countries pursued policies that favored particular domestic
economic interests. The fact that this practice continues with MeBr exemptions
is not surprising, not a break from the past, and probably not indicative of some
larger issue or theoretical development. Some actors have always, and some
actors likely will always, put private economic or other interests ahead of common environmental interests. We should not be surprised to ﬁnd politics going
on in the ozone regime.
The potential exploitation of critical use exemptions (CUEs) was foreseen
when they were created. CUEs were designed by their backers to be easy to use.
Gareau’s book contains too little discussion of the origins of the exemptions,
1. Benedick 1998.
2. Downie 1996.
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details that would have informed the overall discussion. CUEs were allowed for
MeBr, in part because exemptions had already been allowed for CFCs and
halons. In the end, the EU and others decided that CUEs were an acceptable
price to pay for an agreement by the US, Kenya, and other countries to cut
and eventually phase out MeBr. Was that compromise a mistake? Perhaps,
perhaps not, but exemptions are a key tool in overcoming the lowest common
denominator problem.3 In any event, one can easily argue that the origins and
design of the CUEs, which intentionally limited the ability of the treaty’s
governing processes to reduce them without agreement by the country using them
(despite the impression given by some people interviewed for the book), is an
equally plausible explanation of why MeBr use continues under the ozone regime.
One does not need to believe that precaution has been rejected or that the
ozone regime has broken down to understand why actors continue to pursue
CUEs and other exemptions—or why some developing countries might opt
out of the ﬁnal HCFC phaseout. Indeed, the success of the regime in slowing
the pace of ozone depletion allows these actors to argue that the economic
beneﬁts of the MeBr exemptions outweigh the environmental costs. This argument is the same that some European countries made about CFCs in the 1970s
and 1980s and that the US and others made regarding HCFCs for most of the
2000s.
Finally, the book sometimes overstates the importance of MeBr CUEs
on the ultimate success or failure of the ozone regime. MeBr emissions have
declined dramatically since 1995 and the amount of MeBr used via CUEs has
declined signiﬁcantly as well.4 Indeed, the agreement to phase-out MeBr but
allow CUEs, even with all the shenanigans that Gareau correctly details, has
likely produced a greater reduction in MeBr production and use than would
have occurred with a longer phase-out schedule and no allowance for CUEs.
The millions of tons of CFCs, HCFCs, and halons leaking from foams and
equipment no longer in use comprise the largest current source of ODS-weighted
emissions of ozone-depleting substances,5 and their potential impact on the
ozone layer dwarfs that of MeBr. MeBr CUEs, and their quarantine and preshipment uses constitute important ODS emissions, but it is extremely unlikely
they will decide the fate of the ozone layer.
The ozone regime has been remarkably successful. It is far from perfect,
however, and humankind cannot yet be certain it has saved stratospheric ozone
from serious deterioration. From Precaution to Proﬁt does an excellent job of reminding us of this uncertainty by revealing important elements of the political
economy of MeBr. It is an important story, and this is an excellent book. But we
should be careful about trying to build complex theoretical arguments when
simple and durable explanations are available.
3. Chasek et al. 2014.
4. United Nations 2013.
5. WMO et al. 2011.
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